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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. legal system gives contracting parties significant
freedom to customize the procedures that will govern their future
Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., Amherst College; J.D., Harvard
*
Law School.
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disputes.' With forum selection clauses, parties can decide where they
will litigate future disputes. 2 With fee-shifting provisions, they can
choose who will pay for these suits. 3 And with arbitration clauses, they
can make upfront decisions to opt out of the traditional legal system
altogether.4 Parties can also waive their right to appeal, 5 their right to
a jury trial, 6 and their right to file a class action.7 Bespoke procedure,
in other words, is commonplace in the United States.
Far less common, however, are bespoke discovery provisions.
Potential litigants rarely agree to alter the scope of discovery prior to a
dispute.8 Once a lawsuit is filed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
encourage parties to work together to develop a joint discovery plan, 9
1.
See, e.g.,Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005)
("[M]ini-codes of civil procedure are being created by courts, agencies, and a multitude of private
providers. The aspiration for a trans-substantive procedural regime embedded in the Federal
Rules has been supplanted by an array of contextualized processes."); Kevin E. Davis & Helen
Hershkoff, Contractingfor Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 517 (2011) (describing the
"widespread perception that customized procedure is an increasingly important feature of
contracting practice among U.S. firms").
2.
See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991) (upholding a forum
selection clause on the back of a cruise ship ticket).
3.
See Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the Norms
Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 507 (2013) (stating that "courts are perfectly
willing, in theory, to enforce contracts for attorney's fees" but also noting that "they often find ways
to avoid enforcement by strictly construing the agreement, finding that there is no prevailing party
because no party won everything it asked for, or significantly reducing the amount of attorney's
fees").
4.
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (upholding an arbitration
agreement in an employment agreement); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015)
(enforcing an arbitration clause that prohibited class actions or any aggregation of claims in the
arbitration).
See 2 AM. JUR. Appeal and Error § 204 (2010) ('Though there are a few cases to the
5.
contrary, the rule prevailing in the great majority of the jurisdictions is that an [appellate waiver]
is valid and binding, and, when properly pleaded, will constitute a bar to proceedings taken in
violation of the agreement.").
6.
See, e.g., RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002)
("Although the right of trial by jury in civil actions is protected by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution, that right, like other constitutional rights, may be waived by prior written agreement
of the parties."); Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. Disp. RESOL. 181, 185 ("Parties
may also waive their right to a jury trial by signing a pre-litigation contract with a waiver provision
in it. However, these waivers are only enforced if they are knowing, voluntary, and intelligent."
(footnote omitted)); Jane Spencer, Companies Ask People to Waive Right to Jury Trial, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB109269232752592826 (last updated Aug. 17, 2004, 12:01 AM)
[https://perma.cc/QP6D-C6X6].
7.
See, e.g., DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 471 (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act ('TAA")
does not permit states to prohibit class-arbitration waivers in arbitration agreements).
8.
See, e.g., Erin O'Hara O'Connor et al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L.
REv. 133, 166-67 (2012) (summarizing empirical evidence demonstrating that parties rarely
contract around default discovery rules); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedurein Theory
and Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865, 1872 (2015) (stating that "[t]he vast majority of
contracts are silent" on the matter of discovery).
9.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (requiring the attorneys of record in all civil cases requiring
initial disclosure to confer and "attempt[] in good faith to agree on [a] proposed discovery plan" at
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but parties rarely negotiate such agreements ex ante. Nor are bespoke
10
discovery agreements common in arbitration. Even when parties
agree to arbitrate their claim, they seldom negotiate the scope of their
discovery rights once they get into arbitration. Scholars examining the
empirical record have deemed bespoke discovery provisions so rare as
to be nearly mythical."
The lack of bespoke discovery is surprising given the criticism so
often directed at the discovery process. Parties complain that discovery
is too expensive and that its costs are too often disproportionate to the
amount at stake in litigation.1 2 They also argue that parties can use
3
broad discovery requests to force their opponents to settle.1 Indeed, a
recent amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sparked
more than 2,300 comments to the Advisory Committee, many of which
14
bemoaned the high costs of discovery in many cases.
Although bespoke discovery could help contracting parties avoid
these costs, there has been little scholarly examination into how parties

&

least twenty-one days before the pretrial conference with the judge); Michael L. Moffitt,
Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil ProcedureNegotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
461, 501 (2007) ("The idea of customization ... is already well established within discovery.").
10. See, e.g., O'Hara O'Connor et al., supra note 8, at 166-67; Peter B. Rutledge
Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1, 57 (noting that "[o]nly a
handful of credit card arbitration clauses" include provisions that limit discovery).
11. See Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MVARQ. L.
REV. 1103, 1109 (2011) (noting that "while the use of class-arbitration waivers has grown, the use
of discovery limits remains surprisingly static").
12. See, e.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYs., CIVIL LITIGATION SURVEY
OF CHIEF LEGAL OFFICERS AND GENERAL COUNSEL BELONGING TO THE ASSOCIATION OF

CORPORATE COUNSEL 1 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/iaals-general counsel
survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZNU-XXDR] ("Approximately nine out of ten respondents disagreed
with the statement that 'litigation costs are generally proportionate to the value of the case.'");
Jay Tidmarsh, The LitigationBudget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 858 (2015) ('The central theme in the
past thirty years of American procedural reform-with its rise of case management and its
emphasis on proportional discovery-has been the effort to keep litigation costs under control.").
Although the recent amendments to the federal rules make proportionality a more explicit part of
discovery requests, corporate counsels have previously noted that litigating parties often ignore
the stated rules. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra, at 26 (reporting

that "over 70% indicated that parties 'overuse permitted discovery procedures (beyond what is
necessary/appropriate for the particular case)' ").
13. Robert J. Rhee, Toward ProceduralOptionality:Private Orderingof PublicAdjudication,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 528 (2009):
[O]ur current world of high transaction costs enables the logic of frivolous litigation-a
logic of extortion and brinksmanship. A frivolous suit is valueless absent a credible
threat of harmful cost imposition from prosecution, and a determined plaintiff can make
such a threat, thereby coercing a defendant to pay for the avoidance of greater financial
harm.
(footnote omitted).
14. See ProposedAmendments to the Federal Rules of Civil2 Procedure, REGULATIONS.GOV,
(last visited Sept. 28, 2018)
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-000
[https://perma.cclXK4B-F3KG].
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can-and should-use it. Several scholars have noted that contracting
parties can likely alter their discovery rights in future litigation, 15 while
others have recommended litigation prenuptials in the commercial
setting that include discovery. 16 No scholar, however, has specifically
examined the potential of bespoke discovery.
This Article aims to fill that gap by examining how bespoke
discovery can help address wide-reaching concerns about the discovery
process. As used here, bespoke discovery includes all ex ante
agreements between two or more parties regarding how they will collect
and exchange information in any future disputes between them. This
definition is intentionally limited to ex ante agreements. While the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encourage parties to negotiate over the
scope of discovery once the litigation is filed,1 7 bespoke discovery is
focused on agreements that parties reach before a dispute arises. In this
way, bespoke discovery is similar to other dispute-resolution provisions,
such as forum selection provisions or jury trial waivers, often included
in commercial contracts.
Contracting parties can use bespoke discovery to address many
of the complaints about the discovery process in both traditional
litigation and arbitration. To address concerns that discovery is too
expensive,1 8 parties can agree ex ante to limit the scope of discovery,
place caps on the number of depositions or document requests, or enter
into binding discovery budgets. Similarly, to address concerns that
discovery costs are often too one sided, parties can agree to share the
costs of discovery or require that discovery requests specifically identify

15. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making ProceduralRules Through Party
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1346 (2012) ("The conventional wisdom repeated in treatises and
commentaries is that parties have broad power to contract for discovery limits ex ante, but these
claims rely on flimsy case law support." (footnote omitted)); S.I. Strong, Limits of Procedural
Choice ofLaw, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1027, 1078 (2014):
Both the Third and the Seventh Circuits therefore appear to agree that parties may
contractually agree to amend standard rules of procedure relating to a variety of issues,
including discovery. This view is consistent with that taken by commentators who
consider discovery to be one of the easiest practices to regulate by private procedural
contract.
(footnote omitted).
16. See, e.g., Daniel B. Winslow & Alexandra Bedell-Healy, Economical Litigation
Agreements: The "Civil Litigation Prenup"Need, Basis, and Enforceability, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 125, 138 (2010) (providing a model "Economical Litigation Agreement" that includes
provisions related to discovery that parties can adopt at the start of their relationship).
17. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2).
18. See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., FINAL REPORT 16 (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/

default/files/final report on thejoint project of-the-actltaskjforce-on-discovery and theiaal
s_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NU9-ZXY5] (showing survey of trial attorneys with large majority
agreeing that electronic discovery is too expensive).
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the documents at issue. In other circumstances, parties may want to
require all discovery requests to be approved by a neutral third party,
limit discovery to the exchange of documents, or even eliminate
discovery altogether. In short, private ordering offers contracting
parties a variety of ways to shape the discovery process to their
particular needs.
These benefits notwithstanding, bespoke discovery is not a
panacea for the problems in the litigation system. It is only possible
where the parties have a preexisting relationship, and even then,
sophisticated parties may still have trouble predicting their discovery
needs in a dispute that has not yet arisen. These challenges are
compounded for less sophisticated parties, who may not be in a position
to bargain over detailed contractual terms or understand the
implications of complex litigation clauses. Consumers clicking "I agree"
on an online contract and employees presented with a take-it-or-leaveit contract as a condition of employment may not appreciate the costs of
waiving their discovery rights should they later end up in litigation. In
short, bespoke discovery can help address long-standing problems with
the discovery process, but it can also exacerbate existing inequalities.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses why the rise of
bespoke procedure has left the discovery process behind. Part II
examines bespoke discovery in greater depth, describing the various
modifications to default discovery rules that parties can include in their
agreements, as well as possible legal limits on these modifications. Part
III uses a more focused lens to explore the benefits and drawbacks of
bespoke discovery for both sophisticated commercial parties and their
less sophisticated counterparts.
I. DISCOVERY AND THE BESPOKE PROCEDURAL REVOLUTION
A. The Rise of Bespoke Procedure
The U.S. legal system is based on the idea that a single set of
procedural rules will govern all civil disputes. Rule 1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure states that the rules apply "in all civil actions
9
and proceedings in the United States district courts,"1 and most states
20 Yet the reality has always been far more
have similar rules.

19. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
20. See, e.g., FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.010 ("These rules apply to all actions of a civil nature and all
special statutory proceedings in the circuit courts and county courts except those to which the
Florida Probate Rules, the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, or the Small Claims Rules
apply."); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 101 (MCKINNEY 2018) ("The civil practice law and rules shall govern the
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complicated. Many procedural rules are only default rules, allowing
parties to opt out and craft their own procedures. 2 1 Courts have
frequently upheld these opt-outs, allowing parties to send their claims
to arbitration, 22 waive their right to a jury, 23 change how they will
receive service of process, 24 agree not to appeal a decision against
them, 2 5 and waive their right to file a class action. 26
Parties regularly take advantage of these opportunities.
Empirical studies have found that contracting parties routinely agree
to send future disputes to arbitration 2 7 or choose a specific court in
which to litigate. 28 They often agree on whether a judge or jury will
decide their dispute 2 9 as well as how they will allocate the costs of these

procedure in civil judicial proceedings in all courts of the state and before all judges, except where
the procedure is regulated by inconsistent statute.").
21. As explained infra Section II.B, the limits on parties' ability to craft their own procedures
within the legal system are unclear, although scholars have tried to discern certain broad
parameters.
22. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
(noting the federal policy favoring arbitration).
23. See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1986) (noting that "personal constitutional
rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must be tried" are subject
to waiver); Moffitt, supra note 9, at 494 ("As a general matter, federal courts will enforce
contractual waivers of jury rights, though they will construe the contracts narrowly.").
24. See Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (stating that "it is
settled .. . that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given
court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether").
25. See 2 AM. JUR. Appeal and Error § 204 (2010) ('Though there are a few cases to the
contrary, the rule prevailing in the great majority of the jurisdictions is that an [appellate waiver]
is valid and binding, and, when properly pleaded, will constitute a bar to proceedings taken in
violation of the agreement.").
26. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011) (holding that state laws
invalidating class action waivers on unconscionability grounds are preempted by the FAA).
27. See, e.g., O'Hara O'Connor et al., supra note 8, at 161 tbl.1 (finding that 51.5 percent of
CEO employment contracts include an arbitration clause); Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 10, at
17-18 (finding that "95.1% of the dollar value of outstanding credit card loans in the sample was
subject to credit card agreements with arbitration clauses"); Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 1919
(examining four hundred contracts entered into over a fifteen-year period by a range of U.S. and
non-U.S. parties and finding that 48.2 percent included arbitration provisions).
28. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1981 (2006) (finding
that fifty-three percent of corporate merger agreements specified a forum for litigation);
Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 1917 (finding that nearly forty percent of sample contracts included
a forum selection clause for either litigated or arbitrated claims).
29. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value? Evidence from
an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 539, 541 (2007) (finding that twenty percent of surveyed commercial contracts
contained an explicit jury trial waiver); David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 389, 418 (finding over one thousand contracts per year in the EDGAR database that
contained jury waivers, excluding those contracts with arbitration clauses).
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disputes. 30 In short, it is now the rare contract that does not provide at
least some level of detail about how future disputes between the parties
will be decided. 3 1
B. The Absence of Bespoke Discovery
Despite the fact that many forms of bespoke procedure are
common in commercial contracts, parties almost never reach ex ante
agreements about the rules governing discovery. One study, for
example, found that in commercial agreements in the Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval ("EDGAR") database, there were
only a handful of agreements that addressed discovery at all and only a
single agreement in which the parties agreed to contractually limit
discovery if they ended up in litigation. 32 Bespoke discovery provisions
are only slightly more common when the parties agree to arbitrate their
disputes. 33 One study found that only 2.1 percent of credit card
agreements that provided for arbitration addressed discovery rights in
any way. 34 Another found that just six percent of CEO employment
agreements addressed discovery. 35
To be fair, discovery is not the only type of procedure missing
from these contracts. Parties frequently agree on where they will
litigate and who will decide the dispute, but they rarely make ex ante
agreements about how they will litigate. 36 Commercial contracts rarely
address not only discovery but also pleading, joinder, and summary
judgment. 3 7 The rise of bespoke procedure, in other words, has almost
entirely missed most forms of pretrial practice, discovery included.
30. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 29, at 419 ("In the EDGAR database, terms shifting costs
to the losing party in litigation are omnipresent."); Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 1922 tbl.4 (finding
that 23.9 percent of sample contracts included loser-pay provisions).
31. See, e.g., Weidemaier, supranote 8, at 1913 (finding that, in a study of contracts that were
modify the background rules of
included in SEC filings between 2000 and 2012, "almost 90% ...
litigation in some way" and "[i]f we add clauses that expand or limit remedies for breach, only 6.5%
of contracts contain no modification at all, except for any choice of law clause").
32. Hoffman, supra note 29, at 411-13.
33. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of why bespoke discovery
might also be useful in arbitration.
34. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 10, at 39 tbl.7.
35. O'Hara O'Connor et al., supra note 8, at 166. But see Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin
R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 104 tbl.9 (2008) (finding
that approximately twenty-one percent of sampled franchise agreements addressed discovery in
future disputes, although the study was limited to only twenty-eight agreements).
36. See, e.g., Hoffman, supranote 29, at 422 (finding that "not all bespoke procedure is equally
popular"); Paulson, supra note 3, at 473 ("Parties rarely venture beyond a small list of familiar
contractual modifications to procedure, including forum selection and choice of law clauses, jury
waivers, and some damages limitations.").
37. Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 1872 ("What contracts almost never do-in either
arbitration or litigation-is dictate the particulars of pre-trial and trial practice. . . . The vast
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Yet discovery is different than these other types of pretrial
procedure because the discovery process is so often blamed for the ills
of the litigation system. Few general counsel will bemoan the Celotex
standard 38 or Rule 13(g)'s standard for crossclaims, 39 but they will
regularly criticize the rules governing discovery. 40 They will also join
together to lobby Congress, 41 attend conferences with influential judges
and policymakers, 42 and write angry letters to the Rules Committee
demanding changes to the discovery rules. 43 Indeed, when the Advisory
Committee for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was considering
amendments to the discovery rules in 2013 and 2014, it received more
than 2,300 comments, 44 more than almost any proposed rules
amendment in the past. 45 Given this broad dissatisfaction with the
discovery process, it is surprising that parties do not simply opt out of
the default rules, at least where they have the chance.46

majority of contracts are silent on matters of pleading, discovery, evidence, the order and burden
of proof, and related topics.").
38. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (holding summary judgment
appropriate when the nonmovant fails to establish an element necessary to its claim).
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g) (allowing a crossclaim that "arises out of the transaction or
occurrence" at issue in the original claim or a counterclaim).
40.

See, e.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 12, at 2 (finding

that respondents frequently advocated for reducing "scorched earth" discovery and limiting the
number of depositions and interrogatories).
41. Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves"aLittle More: Consideringthe 1998 Discovery
Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 243 (1999) (arguing that the groups lobbying in favor of the 1998
discovery amendments primarily included "defendants, especially defendants in product liability,
securities, and antitrust cases").
42. Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking
Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1140-43 (2015) (describing the attendees at the conference
at Duke University that preceded the 2015 amendments to the federal discovery rules).
43. See Elizabeth Thornburg, Cognitive Bias, the 'Band of Experts, "and the Anti-Litigation
Narrative, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 755, 756 (2016) (stating that the Rules Committee is operating
under the influence of "a decades-long anti-litigation lobbying effort" by corporate America).
44. See ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,supra note 14 (showing
2,351 comments received on the proposed amendments).
45. Proposed amendments to the federal rules of practice and procedure (and comments
thereto) have been published on regulations.gov since the August 2013-14 public comment period.
Rules Comments, U.S. CTs., http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rulescommittees/rules-comments
(last visited Sept. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/AS5H-DR4Y].
Amendment proposals before that period, available back to the 2003-04 comment period, are
published on the website of the U.S. Courts. Id. Before 2013-14, the civil rules public comment
period that received the most comments was the 2004-05 period, with 253 comments. See id.
(select "Civil" and the relevant year in the respective drop-down menus). Since 2013-14, the public
comment period with the most comments was the 2013-14 period, with 2,351 comments. See
ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, supra note 14.
46. Customized procedure only applies in certain types of disputes. The parties in a tort case
arising out of a car accident, for example, would typically not be able to negotiate the rules that
will govern their dispute ex ante because they do not have a preexisting relationship. In many
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In theory, the parties can enter into agreements to change these
default rules once a case is filed. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure expect parties to confer and agree on the scope and
mechanics of discovery.4 7 They also envision that judges will play an
active role in managing parties' discovery disputes. 48 This reliance on
ad hoc development of discovery procedures in individual cases is
understandable given the transsubstantive nature of procedural rules.
The discovery process presents such different challenges across
different types of cases that it is next to impossible for a single set of
rules to address all of these problems. Moreover, many cases do not
involve discovery problems, which makes transsubstantive limits
inappropriate. The Federal Judicial Center has found, for example, that
the median discovery costs for plaintiffs are $15,000, while the median
discovery costs for defendants are $20,000-hardly huge sums that
deserve widespread public attention. 9 Some cases involve far more
discovery and pose greater challenges, but the problems are far from
universal. The rules therefore establish broad principles, leaving ample
room for case-specific decisions and oversight once litigation is filed.
In practice, however, it is difficult for parties already engaged in
litigation to agree on discovery limits. Once a case is underway,
discovery is often a zero-sum proposition. The parties know who needs
broad discovery to prove their claims and who is likely to shoulder the
bulk of the costs. This knowledge creates strategic advantages that the
parties are unlikely to surrender.5 0 Similarly, it is difficult for judges to
rein in excessive discovery requests. As Judge Easterbrook has noted,
judges inevitably know less about the dispute than the parties, and they
have no simple way of determining whether a given discovery request
cases, however, the parties have a relationship before the dispute arises and thus an opportunity
to negotiate the terms that will govern any later disputes.
47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (requiring the parties to confer "as soon as practicable" to, among
other things, "attempt[] in good faith to agree on [a] proposed discovery plan").
48. See FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(2)(F) (providing that, at the pretrial conference, the judge may
take appropriate action to control and schedule discovery).
49. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASEBASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY

COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (Oct. 2009), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/08/
CivilRulesSurvey2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP7V-BTJ4] (concluding that "the median cost,
including attorney fees, was $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants").
50. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, PleadingRules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REV. 873, 899-900 (2009) ("Serious litigation problems should not be left to trial judge
discretion as much as they are today. Judges face information and other constraints that impair
their ability to manage optimally, especially in the highly strategic environment of litigation.");
Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A CriticalLook at ProceduralDiscretion, 28 CARDOzO L. REV. 1961,
1964 (2007) (arguing that "discretionary control over discovery invites parties to contest discovery
matters vigorously, which compounds litigation costs and creates opportunities for strategic
abuse").
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will turn up relevant information.5 1 He states that, as a result, "[t]he
portions of the Rules of Civil Procedure calling on judges to trim back
excessive demands, therefore, have been, and are doomed to be,
hollow."52 In short, the legal system trusts judges and parties to keep
discovery in check once the litigation is filed, but this trust may well be
misplaced.
This reality compounds the mystery of why contracting parties
have not taken greater advantage of ex ante discovery agreements. If
judges' and parties' future selves cannot prevent discovery problems,
one would think parties would be eager to engage in self-help by
including bespoke discovery rules in their agreements. The next Section
addresses why ex ante private ordering is nevertheless so rare in this
area.
C. ExplainingBespoke Discovery'sAbsence
Scholars have developed a number of theories to explain why
commercial contracts so rarely include bespoke discovery provisions.
Perhaps parties are hesitant to limit their discovery rights before they
know the specifics of the dispute. Or perhaps they do not need to craft
custom discovery provisions because they can avoid high discovery costs
by sending their disputes to arbitration. This Section examines these
conventional explanations, describing why they are unlikely to justify
the absence of bespoke discovery provisions. It then develops a new
theory that considers both how contractual innovation occurs in
commercial contracts as well as the incentives of lawyers to include
bespoke discovery in the contracts that they draft.
1. Conventional Theories
There are several possible explanations for why parties do not
adopt bespoke discovery provisions in their agreements. 53 The first
51. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989)
(emphasizing that the "judicial officer always knows less than the parties" and "cannot[ ] know the
expected productivity of a given request"); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559
(2007):
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if
groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through "careful case
management," given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.
(citation omitted) (citing Easterbrook, supra, at 638).
52. See Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 638.
53. A fourth possible explanation, raised briefly in the literature, is that parties do not want
to signal to their counterparties that they are litigious or create fear that either party may not
perform their end of the bargain. As others have noted, however, this explanation ignores the fact
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possibility is that it is simply too difficult for parties to predict what
discovery will be necessary in future disputes. Ex ante, the parties can
agree on where they will litigate and who will decide their dispute, even
if they do not know the exact nature of their claims. It is much more
difficult, however, to predict the types of documents that will be
necessary to support particular claims or defenses that have not yet
arisen. Nor can parties easily predict whether they will need one
deposition or a dozen. As a result, until the parties know the exact
nature of the dispute as well as their specific discovery needs, they may
be reluctant to limit their future litigation rights.
Yet contracting parties precommit themselves all the time,
especially in business and commercial dealings. Contract negotiations
are all about agreeing to future actions in the face of imperfect
information. Parties, for example, agree to sell oil at a set price even
though they recognize that the price might rise, or agree to pay a new
hire a set salary before knowing how the employee will perform. Parties
even routinely agree to more limited rights within the legal system.
Arbitration, for example, has more limited discovery rights than the
traditional legal system. 54 When parties opt to send their claims to
arbitration, parties waive the broad discovery rights to which they
would otherwise be entitled, even though it might later turn out that
broad discovery would be in their interest. The turn to arbitration
demonstrates that parties do limit their discovery rights indirectly by
opting to arbitrate their disputes, rather than directly through the use
of bespoke discovery provisions. In short, the lack of bespoke discovery
provisions cannot reflect an unwillingness by contracting parties to tie
their own hands.
The limited discovery rights in arbitration, however, lead to
another possible explanation for the rarity of bespoke discovery.
Perhaps parties do not need bespoke discovery because they solve the
problems associated with traditional discovery by committing to
arbitrate their claims.5 5 Arbitration has traditionally been viewed as
quicker and cheaper than traditional litigation in large part because

that parties routinely contract for other types of bespoke procedure, such as forum selection or fee
shifting. See Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 1873-74. As a result, it seems unlikely that parties
would bargain for these protections but stop shy of bespoke discovery out of fear of the signals it
might send to the parties on the other side of the deal.
54. See, e.g., Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 11, at 1117 (stating that "reduced discovery is
often cited as among the more appealing features of arbitration").
55. Weidemaier, supra note 8, at 1873 (stating that one theory involving bespoke procedure
is that "parties can capture many of the benefits of customized procedure by using forum selection
and arbitration clauses to allocate disputes to their preferred forum(s)").
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discovery rights in arbitration are often much more limited.56 Under
this reasoning, rather than designing new discovery rules from scratch,
parties simply choose a different venue to litigate their claims that
comes along with a new set of default discovery rules.5 7
Yet limited discovery in arbitration is not a sure thing either. It
is true that the scope of discovery is generally more limited in
arbitration,5 8 but this has started to change. Indeed, the New York
State Bar recently stated that "there has been a trend to inject into
arbitration expensive elements that had traditionally been reserved for
litigation-interrogatories; requests to admit; dispositive motions;
lengthy depositions; and massive requests for documents, including
electronic data."5 9 Parties now bemoan the fact that discovery in
arbitration has "spiraled out of control," as arbitrators make ad hoc
decisions about how much discovery should occur in many cases.60 In
general, parties are entitled to less discovery in arbitration, but it is
hardly a sure bet. 6 1 As a result, agreements to arbitrate any future
claims do not eliminate the problems associated with discovery.
A final possibility is that it is just too hard to craft bespoke
discovery rules. Most customized procedure is relatively simple-the
parties agree that they will litigate in New York, for example, or that

56. Hiro N. Aragaki, Constructionsof Arbitration'sInformalism: Autonomy, Efficiency, and
Justice, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 141, 142 (noting the argument that "arbitration is generally faster,
cheaper, and more efficient than its judicial counterpart"); Lewis L. Maltby, The Myth of SecondClass Justice: Resolving Employment Disputes in Arbitration, in How ADR WORKS 915, 926
(Norman Brand ed., 2002) ("The greatest strength of arbitration is that the average person can
afford it.").
57. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 15, at 1346-47 ("Perhaps the availability of arbitration
explains the paucity of cases involving ex ante agreements: contracting parties might just switch
to arbitration when they are concerned about excessive or abusive discovery in court.").
58. See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS'N 22
(Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2SEB-W92X] (stating that the arbitrator may require the parties to exchange documents and use
his or her discretion to "conduct the proceedings with a view to expediting the resolution of the
dispute"); JAMS Recommended ArbitrationDiscovery Protocolsfor Domestic, Commercial Cases,
JAMS 4 (Jan. 6, 2010), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMSArbitrationDiscoveryProtocols.pdf
[https://perma.cclDXF7-FM28]
[hereinafter Arbitration
Protocols] (providing that discovery in arbitration "should be limited to documents that are directly
relevant to significant issues in the case or to the case's outcome," along with other specified
limits).
59.

N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, ARBITRATION DISCOVERY IN DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL CASES 2

(2009), https://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26861
[https://perma.cc/C$7QQC5HJ.
60. Id.
61. Nor is arbitration necessarily faster than litigation. See Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build
It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration's Image, 30 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579, 585 (2007) (noting that the average time to resolve a case through
arbitration is only slightly shorter than the median time to resolve a case through the litigation
system).
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they will not have a jury. Such terms are not hard to reduce to writing
or explain to a client. It is more difficult to craft provisions that create
enforceable limits on the scope of discovery. How can parties agree in
their contract that they will get some discovery but not too much?
Parties may therefore avoid private ordering in discovery because they
(or their attorneys) may not know how to draft contractual provisions
that will capture the nuances of a future discovery process.
That said, drafting bespoke discovery clauses would hardly be
impossible. Parties can set hard, or even presumptive, limits on the
number of depositions or interrogatories. Or they can prohibit any
discovery before a decision on any 12(b) motion or agree to share the
costs of discovery pursuant to a litigation budget established at the
start of the case. Alternatively, they can adopt another set of discovery
rules, lock, stock, and barrel, so they would not have to draft their
private procedural code from scratch, simply trading one set of default
procedures for another. In short, contracting for amended discovery
rights is difficult, but motivated parties could certainly do it, especially
if they are aided by sophisticated counsel.
2. A Theory of Contractual Innovation
Pulling these points together, it is possible for parties to agree
to bespoke discovery in their contracts. There would be challenges, as
there always are when new terms are added to contracts, but these
challenges are not insurmountable. Additionally, as discussed further
below, bespoke discovery offers several advantages over the default
rules, at least for some parties in some situations. What, then, explains
the lack of bespoke discovery? The most likely explanation is the
difficulty of contractual innovation combined with market dynamics.
Bespoke discovery is a form of contract innovation that simply has not
happened yet, partly because such innovation may not be good for
lawyers.
Contract theory provides that new contractual terms follow a
counterintuitive trajectory. Generally speaking, new terms do not
develop gradually over time, with new companies slowly but
consistently adopting them. Instead, as several scholars have
demonstrated, contract terms are best seen as products subject to
familiar cycles of innovation. 62 These cycles result from "shocks"-or
62. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
7 (2013) (stressing that when contracting parties disregard a standard and utilize a new form
contract, they "take the risk that courts will interpret their terms in an unpredictable way,"
leading to a prevalence of the "innovation-to-standardization cycle"); Hoffman, supra note 29, at
425 (arguing that "as it turns out, the more common pattern is for the market as a whole to shift
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changes in legal interpretations of terms or technological advances. 63
Following these shocks, the market as a whole shifts relatively quickly
to a new term or set of terms after a brief period of experimentation and
development. In other words, contract terms do not change slowly; they
change seismically. 64
In the world of discovery, there has not been a shock to the legal
market that would prompt such a seismic shift. The challenges
associated with discovery have developed over time without a single
event to prompt sweeping change. Discovery is expensive and
unpredictable, but it has been that way for a long time. The rise of ediscovery may be a long-term shock to the legal system, but the initial
response was to reform the formal rules and send more cases to
arbitration. The recognition that these responses have not solved all of
the underlying problems has come more slowly, and the legal system
now appears to be in a period in which extensive electronic discovery is
seen as inevitable rather than as a recent shock to the system.
Moreover, the drafters of commercial contracts (i.e., corporate
lawyers) face strong disincentives to include bespoke discovery
provisions in their contracts. Law firms benefit significantly from broad
discovery. A law firm that convinced its clients to adopt contractual
limitations on discovery might later find that it has inadvertently
slashed the profits of its litigation department. As a result, the legal
market may not want significant contractual innovation in this area.
Additionally, lawyers may rationally be risk averse when it
comes to bespoke discovery. Many contractual terms come from the
parties themselves. Lawyers turn their clients' handshake agreements
into enforceable deals, but the clients themselves decide on the
important terms and bear the risk that these terms might not turn out
well. By contrast, bespoke discovery terms would likely come from

rather quickly to a new term or set of terms after a period of experimentation and innovation in
different possibilities").
63. Professors Choi, Gulati, and Posner examined the sovereign bond market and found that
contractual innovation in this market followed a similar pattern as technology innovation. Prior
to the innovation, existing terms are sticky and rarely change. See Choi et al., supra note 62, at
18-20. Following a shock to the market (the authors describe three such shocks to the sovereign
bond market between 1995 and 2001), more marginal players experiment with new terms. See id.
at 17-18. This period of experimentation lasts until more established market players decide that
a shift in the contractual standard is inevitable. See id. at 21-23. At this point, the more
established players start to develop their own versions of the new standard until one is adopted
more widely. See id. at 23-27. Other scholars have observed similar patterns in the venture capital
industry. See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 133, 155 (2014) (pinpointing the rise of cloud computing as the shock to the market,
resulting in experimentation of new contractual terms by market players).
64. Hoffman, supra note 29, at 425.
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lawyers because they involve legal issues outside of their clients'
expertise.
Lawyers have often been the drivers on other types of common
bespoke procedural terms. For example, lawyers frequently include
choice-of-law provisions or arbitration clauses in their clients' contracts.
Yet lawyers may be protected from client backlash on these types of
clauses because it is more difficult to know in retrospect whether these
clauses were a good or bad idea. Take, for example, a contractual
provision in which the parties agree to send future disputes to
arbitration or agree that these disputes will be governed by New York
law. Counterfactuals with forum selection or choice-of-law are
inherently difficult, which makes it tougher for a client to second-guess
their lawyers after the fact. A recommendation to limit discovery is
riskier. If a dispute later arises in which the client cannot obtain the
documents they need as a result of these limitations, the client could
easily blame the lawyer. On the whole, it might make financial sense
for corporations to limit their discovery rights, but in any given case,
this gamble might backfire, creating a riskier choice for a first moveror the lawyer who suggests that their client be a first mover.
In short, that bespoke discovery might be a good idea does not
mean that parties will necessarily include it in their contracts.
Contractual innovation often requires a precipitating event, and even
then, the drafting parties need the right incentives to include the new
provisions in their contracts. Bespoke discovery has not yet had its
moment in the sun, but in discrete areas of law, corporations may have
the necessary incentives to experiment with bespoke discovery. 65 This
does not mean that corporations in these areas will necessarily adopt
bespoke discovery. After all, contractual innovation is never a sure
thing. Nonetheless, once contracting parties recognize that bespoke
discovery is a possibility, they may be willing to consider it.
II. UNDERSTANDING BESPOKE DISCOVERY
Bespoke discovery has promise, but as with so many things, the
devil is in the details. This Part first explores the different types of
bespoke discovery provisions that parties might include in their
contracts. The discussion then turns to whether parties are permitted
to draft their own discovery rules in the traditional legal system or
65. For example, corporate boards are starting to experiment with bespoke procedure
included in bylaws or charters that would govern shareholder litigation. See, e.g., Verity Winship,
Shareholder Litigationby Contract, 96 B.U. L. REV. 485, 487 (2016) (stating that "provisions that
control the procedure in intracorporate litigation have begun to work their way into corporations'
organizational documents").
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arbitration. As we will see, although there is little clear guidance on the
use of bespoke discovery, the few available cases provide reason to be
optimistic.
A. Types of Bespoke Discovery
Bespoke discovery includes all ex ante agreements between two
or more parties regarding how they will collect and exchange
information in any future dispute between them. This broad definition,
however, does not set out the full panoply of ways in which contracting
parties can tie their own hands during the discovery process. Nor do the
default rules of most courts or arbitration bodies list the ways in which
the rules can be changed. This Section fills that gap, describing several
different types of bespoke discovery provisions that parties might want
to use in their contracts. Parties can pick and choose among these types
of provisions, adopting the ones that best fit their particular
circumstances.
1. Scope
First, parties can agree in their contracts to change the default
scope of discovery. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1),
parties may obtain discovery "regarding any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs
of the case." 6 6 This rule creates a fairly broad entitlement to discovery
material in the possession of an opposing party.
Parties, however, may be able to contract around this standard,
creating different rules regarding the scope of discovery in their future
disputes. One option is for parties to permit an even broader scope of
discovery than currently allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. For example, parties could adopt the prior standard from
the federal rules, which allowed parties to obtain any nonprivileged
material that is relevant to the "subject matter of the action."67
Although the Advisory Committee has noted that the dividing line
between the old standard and the current standard "cannot be defined
with precision,"6 8 the old standard was more permissive, allowing
parties to obtain discovery if it related broadly to the subject matter of
the litigation rather than the current rule's narrower focus on the
discovery related to "any party's claim or defense." 69 Parties could also
66.
67.
68.
69.

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
FED. R. CIv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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eliminate the proportionality requirement under the current rules,
allowing discovery even if a court might find that the request is not
proportional to the interests and amount at stake in the litigation.
More commonly, however, parties would likely limit the scope of
discovery to control the scope and cost of the litigation. The discovery
rules adopted by various arbitration organizations illustrate
alternative ways to define the scope of discovery. These rules suggest at
least three different approaches to determining the scope of discovery.
First, the rules can allow parties to obtain a narrower, but still
flexible, set of documents. For example, the rules can provide that the
scope of permissible discovery shall be limited to information and
documents that are both "relevant and material to the outcome of
disputed issues."70 This standard, which comes from the American
Arbitration Association,7 1 does not allow the parties to obtain all
documents relevant to the claims or defenses in the case; instead, the
parties must establish that the requested documents are also material
to the dispute. Other arbitration bodies use similar standards,
requiring, for instance, that discovery requests be "limited to documents
that are directly relevant to significant issues in the case or to the case's
outcome" 72 or "relevant to the claims and defenses at issue and ...
necessary for the fair resolution of a claim." 73
Second, bespoke discovery provisions can limit discovery, either
categorically or presumptively, to a certain list of documents. 74 For
example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA")
provides a list of documents that are presumptively discoverable in
70. AM. ARB. ASS'N, supra note 58, at 19 (emphasis added); see also International Dispute
Resolution Procedures, INT'L CTR. FOR DIsP. RESOL. 25 (June 1, 2014), https://www.adr.org/sites/
default/files/ICDR%2ORules O.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5YT-GK9Q] ("The tribunal may, upon
application, require a party to make available to another party documents in that party's
possession not otherwise available to the party seeking the documents, that are reasonably
believed to exist and to be relevant and material to the outcome of the case.").
71. AM. ARB. ASS'N, supra note 58, at 19.
72. ArbitrationProtocols, supra note 58, at 4.
ASS'N 16,
LAWYERS
of Procedure for Arbitration, AM. HEALTH
73. Rules
https://www.healthlawyers.org/dr/Documents/Arbitration%20Rules-Old/April%207,%202014.pdf
(last visited Sept. 29, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W7SE-JGPH]; see also Arbitration Rules, INT'L
CHAMBER COM. (Mar. 1, 2017), https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/rules-ofarbitration/ [https://perma.cc/AWD6-V99A] (emphasizing case management techniques that limit
discovery requests to "documents or categories of documents that are relevant and material to the
outcome of the case"); JAMS Engineering and Construction Arbitration Rules & Proceduresfor
Expedited Arbitration, JAMS 18 (Feb. 2015), https://www.jamsadr.com/filesfUploads/
[https://perma.cc/Z7R7Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMSconstruction.expedited.rules-2015.pdf
SWV3] (limiting discovery requests to those that are "focused on the material issues in dispute
and as narrow as reasonably possible").
74.. Similarly, bespoke discovery provisions can rule out certain categories of documents,
prohibiting, for example, the parties from having to turn over confidential information, such as
business dealings with other companies, select financial information, or customer accounts.
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arbitration proceedings between broker-dealers and their customers.7 5
While an arbitrator in a given proceeding can order additional
discovery, the FINRA list serves as a guide to help limit the scope of
discovery.7 6 This approach is best suited for situations in which the
parties can predict the general type of dispute that is likely to arise.
Finally, parties can limit discovery to documents specifically
identified and requested by the opposing party, a model that is fairly
common in arbitration and in other countries.7 7 The norm in U.S. civil
litigation is for the parties to serve broad discovery requests that then
put the burden on their opponent to determine which documents are
responsive. In contrast, the more typical approach in arbitration and
outside of the United States requires the parties to identify the specific
documents that they need to support their claims. For example, the
International Bar Association provides that all requests for production
include "a description of each requested Document sufficient to identify
of a narrow and specific
it" or "a description in sufficient detail ...
requested category of Documents that are reasonably believed to
exist."78 The requesting party must also provide a statement "as to how
the Documents requested are relevant to the case and material to its
outcome."7

As with nearly all types of discovery limits, this approach is not
suitable in all types of cases. Most notably, it would not work in cases
in which the opposing party does not know where the crucial
information lies. For example, if one party needs access to the other
side's emails to prove their case, it is unlikely that the party will know
what specific emails they need, at least without prior access to their
opponent's documents or network. Accordingly, this approach works
best in cases where the parties' relationship is more discrete and the
nature of any future dispute is relatively easy to predict.

75. Discovery Guide, FINRA 7-17 (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/
files/ArbMed/p394527.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV6B-RF37] (providing for the types of documents to
be produced during arbitration discovery).
76. See id. at 1 ("While the parties and arbitrators should consider the documents described
in the Lists presumptively discoverable, the parties and arbitrators retain their flexibility in the
discovery process. Arbitrators can[ ] order the production of documents not provided for by the
Lists . . . .").
77. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and Convergence, 46 VILL.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2001) ("[N]o other country in the world has any system of discovery approaching that
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
78. IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in InternationalArbitration, INT'L B. ASS'N 7 (May
29, 2010), https://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publicationsIBA-guidesand_freematerials.aspx
[https://perma.ccU35R-RQXG] (follow "Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International
Arbitration (2010)" hyperlink; then select "English" in drop-down menu).
79. Id.
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Each of the above options assumes that the contracting parties
want to allow discovery in any future disputes, albeit with different
parameters than the default discovery rules. It is possible, however,
that some contracting parties may want to limit parties to the
documents and other information already in their possession. In other
words, parties might want the scope of discovery to be a null set, at least
when it comes to the exchange of documents. As extreme as this option
sounds, it does have precedent in the world of arbitration. The discovery
provisions in the McCammon Group's arbitration rules, for example,
provide that "[n]o discovery shall be required except by the agreement
of the Parties or by authority of governing law."80 This option is

expressly prohibited by other arbitration organizations and may be
impermissible in traditional litigation under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,8 1 but it illustrates the wide array of theoretically possible
options in altering the default scope of discovery.
2. Authorization to Obtain Discovery
Parties can also agree that they are only entitled to discovery if
their discovery request is specifically approved by a judge or
arbitrator. 82 In a typical civil case, parties conduct discovery on their
own, only involving the court if they cannot resolve a particular
dispute.83 This approach gives the parties more leeway to push the
boundaries and serve more expansive discovery requests because the
burden is on their opponent to get the court involved.
80. Agreement to Arbitrate, MCCAMMON GRP. 4, https://www.mccammongroup.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/TMG-Agreement-to-Arbitrate-Auto-Fill-April-2018.pdf
(last updated
Apr. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YN-P4-KFAA] (allowing discovery in certain limited situations).
81. See, e.g., JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-dispute Clauses
Minimum Standardsof ProceduralFairness, JAMS 4 (July 15, 2009), https://www.jamsadr.com/
files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMSConsumerMinStds-2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
2T6S-Z8FK] [hereinafter JAMSPolicy on ConsumerArbitrations] ('The arbitration provision must
allow for the discovery or exchange of non-privileged information relevant to the dispute."); JAMS
Policy on Employment ArbitrationMinimum Standardsof ProceduralFairness,JAMS 3 (July 15,
2009),
https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS Employment
Min Stds-2009.pdf [https://perma.cclQKB3-6EQ5] (providing that JAMS will only administer
mandatory arbitration in employment cases if, among other requirements, the procedure provides
for "an exchange of core information prior to the arbitration").
82. As discussed below, this type of provision is more likely to be permissible in arbitration
than a court proceeding because it requires the arbitrator or judge to expend greater effort than
in a typical case. In arbitration, this is unlikely to be problematic because the parties pay the
arbitrator by the hour and it is more common for the parties to set their own procedural rules. In
a judicial proceeding, however, the parties do not pay for the judge's time, and the judge may not
agree to a different procedure that requires her to expend far more time and effort on the litigation.
83. See Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism"and ComparativeProcedure, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 277, 292-93 (2002) ("American rules of procedure allow the attorneys to pursue the
discovery of evidence outside the courtroom and yet be backed by the authority of the court in
demanding the cooperation of opponents and witnesses.").
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In arbitration, however, the arbitrator is often far more involved
in the discovery process, approving each individual request for
production of documents. For example, the International Arbitration
Association provides that "the arbitral tribunal may require the parties
to produce documents, exhibits or other evidence within such a period
of time as the tribunal shall determine."8 4 Similarly, in consumer
arbitrations, the American Arbitration Association provides that "the
arbitrator may direct .

.

. specific documents and other information to

be shared between the consumer and business."8 5 Parties that prefer
this standard but want to keep their cases in the traditional legal
system could bring arbitration's discovery rules into the courtroom by
agreeing that all discovery requests be approved by a neutral third
party before the other side has to respond. 86
Discovery under such rules is likely to be narrower because
parties would not be able to obtain discovery without first making the
case to the arbitrator that the specific discovery they have requested is
appropriate. As a result, parties would have a greater incentive to police
themselves to avoid appearing unreasonable. This approach makes it
more difficult for the parties to serve sweeping discovery requests
because requesting parties would know that requests will be reviewed
by a third party.
As a more drastic alternative, the parties could even agree to
cede control over discovery entirely to a third party, such as an
arbitrator or hired discovery expert. In many other countries, it is
commonplace for the judge to control the discovery process, deciding
what specific documents and other materials are relevant to the parties'
claims and defenses.8 7 While it is unlikely that judges in the United
84. Arbitration Rules, INT'L ARB. AsS'N 15 (Apr. 1, 2006), http://i-a-a.ch/rules06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/59ET-4XVL]; see also AAA Dispute Resolution Board Hearing Rules and
Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS'N 4 (Dec. 1, 2000), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/AAA%20
[https://perma.cc/
Dispute%2oResolution%2OBoard%2OHearing%2ORules%20Procedures.pdf
4C7D-M6X2] ("The DRB may require the parties to produce documents at or before any hearing.");
AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, supra note 73, at 16 ("To promote speed and efficiency, the arbitrator,
in his or her discretion, should permit discovery that is relevant to the claims and defenses at issue
and is necessary for the fair resolution of a claim.").
85. Consumer
Arbitration
Rules,
AM.
ARB.
ASS'N
20
(Sept.
1,
2014),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BF24-B3MW].
86. Parties would likely have to pay a neutral third party to perform this oversight role. As
discussed below, parties likely have broad power to amend discovery rules in their cases, but this
does not mean that they can conscript the judge into a new role, especially if this new role is as
time consuming as reviewing and approving every discovery request. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Party
Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (stating that "there has
always been unease over how much control parties should have").
87. See, e.g., George Shepherd, Failed Experiment: Twombly, Iqbal, and Why Broad Pretrial
Discovery Should Be Further Eliminated, 49 IND. L. REV. 465, 499 (2016) (arguing that the United
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States would agree to take such an involved role in litigation, parties
could hire a third party to play this role instead. This approach would
still make discovery available to the parties but would reduce their
ability to unilaterally expand the scope of the discovery process.
3. Types
Parties can also agree on the permissible types of discovery.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties can use a variety of
discovery tools, including mandatory disclosures, depositions, requests
for production of documents, interrogatories, requests for admissions,
and (at least in a subset of cases) requests for physical and mental
examinations. In their ex ante agreements, however, parties could
agree to forego some of these tools or even limit themselves to only one
tool. For example, the parties could agree that discovery will be limited
to the exchange of documents and will not include other types of
discovery, such as depositions or interrogatories. Or they could agree to
go without depositions while still permitting other tools. These limits
are fairly common in arbitration,8 8 and it is easy to imagine parties
wanting to bring these limits into the courtroom.
Parties can also agree to more nuanced limits on discovery. For
example, they can agree that they will not restore backup tapes or
erased, fragmented, or damaged data. 89 They can agree that they will
use technological means to review e-discovery, such as predictive
coding, rather than investing in far more expensive attorney
reviewers. 90 They can also agree that they will not be entitled to
information from third parties or their own corporate parents or
subsidiaries. Finally, they can agree that they will only preserve
documents from certain custodians within their own companies. Each

States should model discovery reforms on the systems in Britain, Europe, or Japan, in which
"litigants may sometimes obtain limited discovery after convincing a judge of exceptional need").
88. See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS'N, supra note 85, at 20 ("No other exchange of information beyond
[limited production of documents] is contemplated under these Rules, unless an arbitrator
determines further information exchange is needed to provide for a fundamentally fair process.");
INT'L CTR. FOR DIsP. RESOL., supra note 70, at 26 ("Depositions, interrogatories, and requests to
admit as developed for use in U.S. court procedures generally are not appropriate procedures for
obtaining information in an arbitration under these Rules."); JAMS, supra note 73, at 18
("Depositions will not be taken except upon a showing of exceptional need for same and with the
approval of the Arbitrator.").
89. See, e.g., ArbitrationProtocols, supra note 58, at 5 (providing that, "[a]bsent a showing of
compelling need," parties do not need to produce metadata or documents from backup servers,
tapes, or other media not used in the ordinary course of business).
90. See, e.g., Paul W. Grimm, Are We Insane? The Quest for Proportionalityin the Discovery
Rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 REV. LITIG. 117, 167 (2017) (stating that "$0.73 of
each dollar spent [on electronic discovery] is attributed to attorney review").
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of these limits would allow parties to tailor the discovery process to their
own particular needs.
4. Amount
Additionally, parties can negotiate the quantity of discovery.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include certain numerical
limitations, specifying, for example, that parties can conduct no more
than ten depositions and serve no more than twenty-five interrogatories
91
during the course of the litigation without permission of the court.
When it comes to requests for production of documents or requests for
admissions, there are no hard limits, 9 2 although even these forms of
93
discovery must be proportional to the needs of the case.
Parties, however, can agree on different limits ex ante in their
contracts. They can provide, for example, that they are each only
allowed to take two depositions or serve five interrogatories on the other
side. 94 Or they can agree that most depositions will last no more than
four hours, with the parties each able to select a single deposition to last
longer. Alternatively, parties could tie the amount of discovery to the
amount at stake in the case, agreeing, for instance, that in the discovery
process, no party shall have to spend more than twenty-five percent of
the amount at stake in the litigation. These specifications would reduce
the costs of discovery while forcing parties to prioritize the forms of
discovery that they think will best help their case.

&

91. See FED. R. ciV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (requiring court approval for more than ten depositions);
FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1) ("Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, a party may serve
on any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.").
92. See FED. R. CIv. P. 34; FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
93. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (providing that "[plarties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs
of the case").
94. For similar examples from arbitration, see JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules
Procedures, JAMS 21 (July 1, 2014), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMSRules/JAMS-comprehensive-arbitration rules-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4UK-XQ82] ("Each
Party may take one deposition of an opposing Party or of one individual under the control of the
opposing Party."). See also Arbitration Rules, MAR. ARB. ASS'N U.S. 12 (Oct. 11, 2017),
2
http://www.maritimearbitration.comlfilesMAA%20Arbitration%2Rules% 0112017%
will allow one
generally
tribunal
Arbitral
("The
20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z49-4MHN]
deposition of an opposing Party, or of one person under the control of an opposing Party.");
Employment Rules and Procedures, NAT'L ARB. & MEDIATION 6 (July 12, 2017),
https://www.namadr.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Emp-RulesandProced.pdf
[https://perma.cclLBF6-KSWN] (providing, among other limits, that the parties may only "make
requests for up to 30 documents" and all such documents must be ones "upon which the responding
Party relies in support of its answers to the interrogatories").
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5. Timing
Parties can also negotiate the timing of discovery. Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties are generally allowed to
commence discovery after their Rule 26(f) conference. 95 The rules also
permit the parties to use discovery tools in any sequence, 96 although
very little discovery is permitted before the filing of the suit.9 7

The parties, however, can change these rules as well. In their
contracts, for example, they can agree that each side will be entitled to
specific documents before the filing of litigation 98 or that discovery will
be stayed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. 99 They can also
provide that the parties must use certain discovery tools first (e.g.,
requests for production of documents before depositions) or that
discovery must occur in stages. They can also specify the maximum
length of time that the entire discovery process can take.10 0 These
requirements have the potential to make the discovery process more
efficient, as discussed further below.
6. Funding
Parties can also change the rules governing the funding of
discovery. Under the default rules, parties each pay their own discovery
costs. 101 As a result, if one party has custody of most of the relevant
documents, they pay most of the discovery costs. These cost-allocation
rules create incentives for parties to file frivolous claims because parties

95. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1).
96. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(d)(3).
97. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 27 (permitting depositions prior to the filing of the lawsuit to
perpetuate a witness's testimony).
98. See Elliott-McGowan Prods. v. Republic Prods., Inc., 145 F. Supp. 48, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(prohibiting a contracting party from accessing the other party's books and records more than one
year after the statement for the specified goods was issued in accordance with contract provisions,
despite right to pretrial inspection under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
99. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1) (2012)
(providing that, in a securities class action, "all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed
during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds, upon the motion of any party,
that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to
that party").
100. See, e.g., NAT'L ARB. & MEDIATION, supra note 94, at 7 ("All discovery must be completed
within ninety (90) calendar days after the selection of the Arbitrator except for good cause
shown.").

101. See Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (referencing the
"bedrock principle known as the American Rule" by which "[e]ach litigant pays his own attorney's
fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise" (quoting Hardt v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252-53 (2010))).
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may reasonably decide to settle claims to avoid the high costs of
defending against them, even if they think they are without merit. 102
Contracting parties, however, can change these default rules,
choosing a different allocation of discovery costs. There are a variety of
ways that parties might divide discovery costs through private
ordering. First, they can provide that the requesting party will pay the
costs of production, which would create incentives for each side to serve
more narrowly tailored discovery requests. Second, they can specify
that the parties will share the costs equally, an approach that might be
preferable if the parties anticipate that one side will possess the lion's
share of the discovery material and thus would have to pay the bulk of
the expenses under the default rules. Finally, they can agree that they
will come up with a litigation budget that will be enforceable by the
court. This proposal may sound farfetched, but the United Kingdom
now requires parties in many types of litigation to adopt a binding
litigation budget, and scholars have proposed a similar approach in the
United States. 10 3 Accordingly, it is not beyond the realm of possibility
that some contracting parties might agree to such an approach as a way
to limit their discovery costs.
7. Wholesale Adoption of New Rules
None of these options are mutually exclusive. The parties can
pick and choose different combinations of bespoke discovery rules just
as they pick and choose the other provisions of their agreement.
Alternatively, however, parties might decide to adopt another
jurisdiction's discovery rules in their entirety. Although this option
would be unusual, it is not all that different from substantive choice-oflaw provisions in which parties agree that any future disputes will be
governed entirely by New York or California substantive law.
More specifically, just as contracting parties from Texas can
specify that New York substantive law will govern their disputes,
parties should also be able to decide that they want to adopt discovery
rules from another jurisdiction. For example, parties could agree that
they will litigate in Virginia federal court but be bound by Virginia state
102. See Jessica Erickson, Heightened Procedure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 61, 70-74 (2016)
(discussing the impact of cost asymmetries in litigation).
103. See, e.g., Tidmarsh, supra note 12, at 858-59 (proposing a model by which parties develop
a litigation budget at the start of the case and present it to the court for approval); Neil H. Andrews,
Accessible, Affordable, and Accurate Civil Justice-Challenges Facing the English and Other
Modern Systems 3-4 (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2330309
2013),
35/2013,
No.
Paper
[https://perma.cc/TA58-ETUX] (noting that litigation costs in the United Kingdom had been
steadily increasing in recent years).
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discovery rules or New York state discovery rules. 1 04 Alternatively, U.S.
and foreign contracting parties could choose to be governed by a foreign
country's discovery rules, recognizing that the contracting parties may
want the security of the U.S. legal system but not necessarily its
expansive discovery rights. Finally, parties might choose to be governed
by the discovery rules of a specific arbitration organization. Bringing
the discovery rules from arbitration into the legal system would limit
discovery but still preserve other rights that come with litigation, such
as a right to a jury and a right to appellate review of trial court
decisions. In other words, it is at least theoretically possible for parties
to mix and match their procedural rules, choosing the discovery rules
from one venue and other procedural rules from an alternative venue.
These final examples bring to the forefront deeper questions
about parties' ability to contract around the default discovery rules. It
is one thing to suggest that parties can restrict the number of
depositions in future disputes, change the sequencing of discovery tools,
or even limit the scope of discovery. It is another thing altogether to ask
a court to throw out its own discovery rules and adopt wholesale
another jurisdiction's rules. The next question therefore is whether
parties really have that much control over the discovery process.
B. Legal Limits on Bespoke Discovery
Contracting parties likely have significant freedom to alter
default discovery rules in both litigation and arbitration, although this
freedom is neither unlimited nor well delineated in the law. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide partial guidance on the scope of private
ordering in discovery, at least in the federal courts. Rule 29 provides
that "[u]nless the court orders otherwise, the parties may stipulate
that ...
other procedures governing or limiting discovery be
modified."10 5 The 1970 Advisory Committee Notes that accompanied the
addition of this language stated that, at least at that time, "[iut [was]
common practice for parties to agree on such variations, and the
amendment recognizes such agreements and provides a formal

104. As one example of the potential differences, Virginia state discovery rules do not provide
for mandatory initial disclosures, VA. R. SUP. CT. 4:1, while federal discovery rules do, FED. R. C1V.
P. 26(a)(1). See also Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing
a Uniform Code of State Civil ProcedureThrough a CollaborativeRule-Making Process, 58 VAND.
L. REV. 1167, 1216-24 (2005) (discussing the differences between state and federal discovery
rules).
105. FED. R. CIV. P. 29(b).
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mechanism in the rules for giving them effect." 106 Several states have
similar rules as well.107

Based on this rule and a few isolated cases, 108 some scholars and
treatises have argued that parties are free to craft their own discovery
provisions. 109 Yet this analysis ignores two possible complications from
Rule 29. First, the rule expressly permits courts to limit parties' ability
to use bespoke discovery, and at least some courts have done so.110 For
example, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
provides in its local rules that, "[a]bsent leave of court, the parties have
no authority to modify the limitations placed on discovery by court
order."1 1 1 This provision does not forbid parties from attempting to craft
their own bespoke provisions, but it does expressly invite individual
judges to reject discovery agreements in their standing or case-specific
orders.
Second, and more significantly, the term "stipulation" typically
refers to agreements reached by counsel while a case is pending, not an
ex ante agreement. 112 Neither the express language nor the legislative
history of Rule 29 specifies whether the rule only authorizes discovery
agreements made once the case has been filed. There are also very few
cases interpreting the parameters of the rule. 113 Accordingly, it is an
open question whether Rule 29 and state equivalents permit ex ante
agreements to modify discovery procedures.

106. FED. R. CIV. P. 29 advisory committee's note to 1970 amendment.
107. E.g., IND. R. TRIAL P. 29; Mo. SUP. CT. R. 56.01.
108. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 15, at 1346 (pointing out that "[t]he conventional wisdom
repeated in treatises and commentaries is that parties have broad power to contract for discovery
limits ex ante, but these claims rely on flimsy case law support," often a single case from the 1950s
(footnote omitted)).
109. See, e.g., 11-1 MATTHEW BENDER & Co., BENDER'S FORMS OF DISCOVERY § 1.04 (2018)
("[P]rovided there is no inequality of bargaining power, [parties] may also contractually limit
discovery with respect to future litigation."); Noyes, supra note 61, at 610 ("So long as the parties
agree, and memorialize the agreement with a letter, they may permit absolutely no discovery,
permit far broader discovery than the 'default' scope of discovery permitted by the Federal Rules,
or alter the 'approved' procedures for conducting discovery."); Thornburg, supra note 6, at 202
("Discovery is, after all, party-initiated and parties can choose to limit their discovery. Discovery
limits can also be chosen by contract." (footnote omitted)).
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 29(b) (providing that parties can enter into discovery stipulations
"[u]nless the court orders otherwise"); see also OHIO R. CIV. P. 29 staff note (stating that Ohio's
version of Rule 29, which is identical to the federal rule, "explicitly makes the court the master of
its procedure").
111. N.D. OHIO R. 26.1.
112. Stipulation, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a stipulation not only as
"[a] material condition or requirement in an agreement," but also as a "voluntary agreement
between opposing parties concerning some relevant point").
113. See Paulson, supra note 3, at 513 ("Though the 1993 change is twenty years old, there are
very few cases involving pre-dispute agreements to limit discovery.").
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If Rule 29 does not apply, the permissibility of these ex ante
provisions will likely be governed by more general rules regarding
bespoke procedure. Here too, however, the law is not clear. Although
some scholars claim that bespoke procedure is generally permissible, 114
there is remarkably little law to support this conclusion. There are few
statutes or rules that delineate when parties can opt out of procedural
rules. Relevant cases tend to arise in specific fact scenarios that make
it difficult to discern more generally applicable rules. 115 For example,
the Supreme Court has made clear that parties can enter into forum
selection clauses, 116 waive their class action rights,1 17 and opt out of
specific applications of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 118 but these
holdings do not necessarily mean that all bespoke procedural
agreements are permissible.
Even in the absence of binding case law, however, there are some
clear limits on bespoke procedure more generally. First, parties cannot
enter into their own agreements that expand the jurisdiction of the
courts. 119 This limitation, while obvious, is unlikely to have much
impact on bespoke discovery provisions, which govern how, rather than
where, the case is litigated. Second, parties cannot waive procedural
rights or obligations that Congress or individual states have expressly
stated cannot be modified. 120 This limitation is also unlikely to have
much impact in the discovery context because the legislative branch has
never expressly stated that these rules are mandatory. Third, parties
are subject to normal contract law, which prohibits any contractual
12 1 In a
provisions that are unconscionable or contrary to public policy.
number of cases, courts have used the unconscionability doctrine to
invalidate bespoke discovery provisions that unreasonably limit one
side's access to information, especially in cases involving substantially

114. See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 61, at 583 (concluding, with certain exceptions, "that there is
a presumption that litigation rules may be modified by an ex ante contract and that such a contract
is subject to specific performance").
115. See Bone, supra note 15, at 1352 ("Still, judges seem quite willing to enforce most
agreements as long as they deal with the set of procedures recognized as suitable for ex ante
specification.").
116. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
117. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011).
118. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 202 (1995).
119. See Moffitt, supra note 9, at 465 ("Clearly, for example, the parties cannot-even with
consent-create subject matter jurisdiction in a court that otherwise has none.").
120. See Noyes, supra note 61, at 583 ("The contract will not be enforceable, however, ....
where Congress has acted to affirmatively prohibit modification of a specific litigation rule .... ).
121. See id. at 639 (stating that "courts are much more likely to refuse to enforce such
agreements because they are found to be 'unconscionable' or because they are not made 'knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently' ").
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unequal bargaining power between the parties. 122 Fourth, parties
should not be able to agree on bespoke procedures that significantly
impair the rights of third parties. 123 This limit, applied to the discovery
context, might mean that litigating parties cannot expand the Rule 45
subpoena power1 24 to give them greater ability to get information from
third parties.
Beyond these specific rules, scholars have argued that there are
other, more fundamental limits on parties' ability to craft their own
procedures. Assuming that discovery is not treated differently than
other types of procedural private ordering, these suggested limits might
apply to bespoke discovery as well. These proposed limits reflect
broader foundational concerns about parties' ability to influence the
nature of the judicial system itself. Scholars have phrased their concern
in different ways. One scholar argues that a court reviewing a bespoke
procedural agreement should determine whether the agreement would
"impermissibly undermine the institutional integrity of the court." 125
Another argues that bespoke procedure cannot "irreparably discredit
the courts." 126 Still another argues that bespoke procedure cannot
interfere with the judge's ability to engage in principled reasoning,
which he argues is the "core element of adjudication." 1 2 7 Regardless of
the specific phrasing, the idea is that there are certain attributes of the
U.S. judicial system that are so fundamental to its legitimacy that the
parties cannot contract around them.
It is unlikely, however, that this idea would invalidate most
forms of bespoke discovery. Even if the parties agreed to significantly
limit their discovery rights, the court could still engage in principled

122. See, e.g., Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 387 (6th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting limitations on discovery because they "could significantly prejudice employees or
applicants"); Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 70 F. App'x 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
a contract was unconscionable based in part on discovery limitations); Lucey v. FedEx Ground
Package Sys., Inc., Civil No. 06-3738 (RMB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77454, at *35-36 (D.N.J. Oct.
18, 2007) (finding arbitration provision unconscionable in part because of provision "virtually
eliminating discovery"). But see Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341-42 (calling into question "case[s]
finding unconscionable or unenforceable as against public policy consumer arbitration agreements
that fail to provide for judicially monitored discovery").
123. Yet, as Professor Bone persuasively argues, this limitation should not be stretched too
far. See Bone, supra note 15, at 1373. Party decisionmaking in litigation may already harm third
parties in a number of ways, and yet no one seriously suggests prohibiting any party decisions that
impact third parties. As a result, Professor Bone suggests that "[t]he important question therefore
is not whether party-chosen rules might harm third parties but instead whether, and by how much,
those rules are likely to exacerbate the harmful effects that already exist." Id.
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 45.
125. Sarah Rudolph Cole, ManagerialLitigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy
in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1205 (2000).
126. Noyes, supra note 61, at 583.
127. Bone, supra note 15, at 1390.
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decisionmaking based on the facts the parties have available to them.
The institutional integrity of the courts does not depend on a specific
quantum of discovery. The most problematic examples would likely
arise in cases that already raise other concerns. For example, the
institutional integrity of the courts might be threatened if courts
routinely enforced private agreements that deprived vulnerable parties
of the evidence needed to prove their claims, but such agreements
should already be suspect under the unconscionability doctrine.
Conversely, run-of-the-mill discovery provisions, especially between
sophisticated commercial parties, should be enforceable.
The limits outlined above would still give parties broad ability
to craft ex ante discovery rules. Given the lack of clear legal guidance
in the area of bespoke procedure, however, it is possible that future
courts might decide on even more stringent limits. One scholar, for
example, argues that courts are not bound at all by parties' litigation
choices.1 28 This argument starts with the proposition that parties are
subordinate to the law and judicial authority. Accordingly, they cannot
craft their own procedural rules unless the law expressly empowers
them to do so. 12 9 This view, however, is contrary to the approach
generally taken by the courts. Although the Supreme Court has not laid
down a general rule governing the extent to which the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure can be overridden by the parties, it has held that both
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidence are "presumptively waivable." 130 Similarly, in upholding a
31
forum selection clause and certain other forms of bespoke procedure,1
the Supreme Court has held that the key inquiry is whether the clause
was fundamentally fair, a standard that the Court has easily found
satisfied. 132 In other words, at least over the last thirty years, the
Supreme Court has been fairly accepting of bespoke procedural clauses,
128. Dodson, supra note 86, at 19.
129. See id. (asserting that parties are subordinate "unless the law empowers or allows party
dominance").
130. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 202 (1995) ("Absent some 'overriding
procedural consideration that prevents enforcement of the contract,' courts have held that
agreements to waive evidentiary rules are generally enforceable even over a party's subsequent
objections." (quoting 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 5039, at 207-08 (1977))). It is important, however, not to read the Supreme
Court's holding in this case too broadly. It is one thing to hold that the parties can waive a federal
procedural protection altogether. It is a very different thing to say that parties can replace a rule
with a different procedural standard and then demand that the court apply that standard. As one
example, even if parties can agree that neither will file 12(b)(6) motions, it is not clear that they
can alternatively draft a different 12(b)(6) standard and then ask the court to apply their standard
rather than the Twombly standard.
131. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991).
132. See id. ("It bears emphasis that forum-selection clauses contained in form passage
contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness."). This was not always the case.
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even if it has never laid down a general rule for the area. 133 This history
provides reason to be optimistic that courts would uphold bespoke
discovery provisions in private contracts.
The same is likely true in arbitration, although parties who
choose to arbitrate their disputes may also face limits on their ability to
contractually limit discovery. First, traditional contractual defenses
apply in arbitration as well. As a result, parties should not be able to
enforce limits on discovery that are unconscionable or contrary to public
policy. Second, although each arbitration body has different minimum
guidelines, it is not uncommon for arbitration rules to prohibit the
parties from waiving all of their discovery rights. For example, one
arbitration body provides that any consumer arbitration must "allow
for the discovery or exchange of non-privileged information relevant to
the dispute." 134 A contractual provision that barred discovery entirely
would be void under these protections. Other arbitration bodies have
very different default rules, with some even providing for no discovery
at all. 13 5 As a result, parties who decide to arbitrate their disputes must
review the applicable rules of their arbitration organization to
determine if and to what extent they can create their own bespoke
discovery rules. 136
To summarize, although the legal limits are not set in stone,
bespoke discovery is likely permissible in the U.S. legal system. These
provisions will be subject to traditional contractual defenses and
therefore cannot be unconscionable or against public policy. Courts may
also reject bespoke clauses that interfere with the institutional integrity
of the courts. In arbitration, parties should also be cognizant of any
specific limits from their arbitration organizations. Broadly speaking,
however, contracting parties likely have wide latitude to devise their
own rules to govern discovery in any future disputes between them.

133. Admittedly, however, these cases are in factual contexts other than discovery, and there
are other cases, often in the state courts, in which judges have been more skeptical of parties'
efforts to do an end run around standard procedural rules. See, e.g., Am. Benefit Life Ass'n v. Hall,
185 N.E. 344, 345 (Ind. App. 1933) ("It is far better for the courts to make the rules of evidence for
all cases, as it is only by such method that any uniformity can be attained and any degree of
certainty assured."); State v. Downey, 2 P.3d 191, 200 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) ("The parties are
precluded from devising their own rules of evidence."). As a result, it is certainly possible that the
federal courts could articulate a different rule if parties tried to change more central aspects of the
legal system or that courts in other jurisdictions could be more skeptical of bespoke procedure.
134. JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations, supra note 81, at 4.
135. McCAMMON GRP., supra note 80, at 4.
136. Arbitrators are likely to be less concerned with the "core attributes" or the impact of
bespoke discovery rules on the "institutional integrity" of the arbitration process, especially given
the long history of private ordering in arbitration.
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III. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF BESPOKE DISCOVERY
If parties can indeed enter into bespoke discovery agreements,
the final question is whether it is in their best interests to do so. This
Part addresses the costs and benefits of bespoke discovery, recognizing
that they may well depend on the sophistication of the contracting
parties. The analysis first explores how bespoke discovery can benefit
sophisticated parties before turning to the challenges of bespoke
discovery for their less sophisticated counterparts.
A. Bespoke Discovery and Sophisticated Parties
Assuming that parties can enter into bespoke discovery
agreements, should they do so? This Section first explores how bespoke
discovery can benefit sophisticated parties by both reducing the total
costs of discovery and addressing cost asymmetries that distort
incentives. It then turns to the challenges of bespoke discovery for these
parties, examining the difficulties of predicting optimal discovery limits
before disputes arise. This Section provides a foundation to consider the
risks of bespoke discovery for less sophisticated parties in the next
Section.
1. The Value of Cost Reduction
The greatest value of bespoke discovery is that it allows
contracting parties to reduce their future litigation costs. Most types of
bespoke discovery would limit the total volume-and therefore the total
costs-of discovery. Bespoke discovery provisions are especially well
suited to reduce discovery costs because they can be used selectively in
those situations in which discovery costs are most likely to be
problematic.
In the majority of civil cases, limitations on discovery are not
necessary. Empirical research has demonstrated that discovery does
not impose significant costs in most cases. 137 In a 2009 study, for
example, the Federal Judicial Center found that most attorneys in the
study thought the amount and costs of discovery in their cases were
"just the right amount." 138 Most parties also spend relatively low
137. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1652, 1687-88 (2013) (discussing studies and concluding that "[e]ven if more cases engage in
substantial discovery today, all can agree that discovery does not lead to excessive costs, delay, or
unjust outcomes in cases in which little or no discovery is exchanged").
138. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 49, at 27-28. Nor do most parties use the full amount of
discovery available to them. Studies have shown, for example, that although parties are permitted
ten depositions as a matter of right, nearly half of respondents took no nonexpert depositions. Id.
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amounts on discovery-plaintiffs report spending 1.6 percent of the
amount at stake on discovery, while defendants report spending 3.3
percent. 139 These figures suggest that discovery costs generally tend to
be fairly low and therefore across-the-board discovery reforms are likely
not necessary.
The reality is quite different in a subset of cases, usually those
that are more complex. The Federal Judicial Center's study found that
attorneys in approximately twenty-five percent of cases believed that
the costs of discovery were too high relative to the amount at stake in
the case. 140 Other studies back up these impressions. For example, a
2008 survey of Fortune 200 companies found that in cases with total
litigation costs of more than $250,000, the ratio of the average number
of discovery pages to the average number of exhibit pages-that is,
pages actually utilized in some fashion at trial-was 1,044 to 1.141
Attorneys in another study estimated that sixty percent of discovery
materials did not justify the cost associated with obtaining them. 142
This empirical data suggests that expansive discovery is a
problem in some, but certainly not all, cases, which means that
transsubstantive solutions sweep too broadly. Yet these cases tend to
capture the public's attention and drive procedural reform. 143 In Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court
justified more stringent pleading standards on the grounds that more
careful screening of cases is necessary "to avoid the potentially
enormous expense of discovery in cases with no 'reasonably founded
hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' to
claim." 1 4 4 The Supreme Court's solution of heightened
support a ...
at 10. In those cases in which the parties did take nonexpert depositions, they only took an average
of 3.8 for the plaintiffs and 2.8 for the defendants. Id. Similarly, although parties are entitled to
serve twenty-five interrogatories, approximately twenty percent of parties do not serve any
interrogatories at all. Id. at 9.
139. Id. at 43.
140. Id. at 28.
141. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES app.

1, at 16 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/litigation_costsurvey-oLmajorcompanies_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2YG-ZQX9].
142. Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the FrontLines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the
System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 230 n.24. In another study of attorneys
who represent both plaintiffs and defendants, nearly fifty-three percent agreed or strongly agreed
that "parties increase the cost and burden of discovery in federal court through delay and
avoidance tactics." LEE & WILLGING, supra note 49, at 71-72.
143. Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on
Adjusting the "One Size Fits All" Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 392-93 (2010) ("We do not
know if the so-called large cases constitute five percent, ten percent, or more of the entire federal
docket. We do know that it is those cases that tend to occupy a good deal of the attention of federal
judges and the press." (footnote omitted)).
144. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Dura
Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
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pleading standards, however, was a poor fit for the underlying problem.
If discovery costs are not a significant problem in most cases, it makes
no sense for the Supreme Court to raise pleading standards in all civil
cases. Targeted solutions, in other words, are more appropriate than
across-the-board approaches.
Moreover, even focusing on those cases with excessive discovery
costs, the Supreme Court has chosen an approach that is ill suited to
address the specific problems in these cases. Professor Joanna Schwartz
has discussed how the Supreme Court has primarily chosen to fortify
the gateways of litigation-such as motions to dismiss, class
certification, and summary judgment-when addressing concerns
about the costs and delay in litigation.1 45 Yet while these efforts might
reduce costs, it is less certain that they are effective in weeding out only
meritless claims. Dismissing a plaintiffs claims if they do not have
sufficient factual support at the start of the case leads to the dismissal
of meritless and meritorious claims alike. As Professor Schwartz
argues, "If discovery in a case is too expensive or slow but the case has
enough merit to proceed to the next stage of litigation, then closing the
gateway and dismissing the case is too harsh a remedy." 146
The Judicial Conference has chosen a different strategy to
address excessive discovery costs-greater judicial oversight of the
discovery process. In successive rounds of amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Judicial Conference has given judges
greater power over the discovery process. 147 Rule 16 now encourages
judges to exercise close supervision over discovery in the pretrial
conference,1 48 while Rule 26 gives judges the power to determine
whether the parties' discovery requests are "proportional to the needs
of the case" and to narrow the scope of discovery in other ways for good
cause.149
Yet it is extremely difficult for judges to impose any meaningful
limits on the discovery process. 15 0 Judges always know less than the
parties about the details of the dispute and thus are in a poor position
to know whether specific discovery requests will lead to relevant

145. See Schwartz, supra note 137, at 1672 (arguing that "the Court fortified [the pleading]
gateway in response to concerns that the high costs and other burdens of litigation cause
defendants to settle weak cases and suffer other harms and that district court judges are
ineffective at managing the pretrial pathways in a way that would prevent these injustices").
146. Id. at 1691.
147. Id. at 1678.
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
150. Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 638 ("Judges can do little about impositional discovery
when parties control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves.").
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information. 15 1 Additionally, judges are juggling significant caseloads
and therefore face structural disincentives to micromanage the
discovery process in individual cases. 152 In short, the traditional
solutions to the high costs of discovery in certain types of cases-new
transsubstantive pleading standards or greater judicial managementare unlikely to work.
Bespoke discovery offers distinct advantages over these
approaches. First, parties must choose to include bespoke discovery in
their contracts. This opt-in approach means that bespoke discovery will
be used in situations in which both parties have reason to believe that
the costs of broad discovery in their particular dispute will exceed its
benefits. Unlike the transsubstantive pleading rules adopted by the
Supreme Court in Twombly, bespoke discovery should, at least in
theory, be tailored to the subset of cases in which discovery is most
likely to be excessive. Second, parties themselves decide on the specific
limits that will apply in their lawsuits. Parties should have more
information than judges about the specific nature of their disputes and
thus should be in a better position to predict the types of restrictions
that will be appropriate. And they have the financial incentives to
enforce these restrictions.
Bespoke discovery also addresses the strategic incentives that
have contributed to escalating discovery costs. Discovery presents its
own version of the prisoner's dilemma. 153 If each party thinks that the
other side will serve sweeping discovery requests, it will respond in
kind, even if more limited discovery would otherwise be in the parties'
collective interest. By agreeing to ex ante limits on discovery, the
parties can tie their own hands and avoid unnecessary discovery
requests. 154
151. See id. (asserting that because judicial officers "always know[ I less than the parties,"
they cannot "know the expected productivity of a given [discovery] request").
152. See, e.g., Paul Stancil, Balancing the PleadingEquation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 97 (2009):
The simplest and most common means by which judges reduce their workload is by
insisting that the parties resolve their own pretrial disputes, especially those relating
to discovery. Judges often are able to create and sustain a credible threat of retribution
toward litigants-a threat that in turn limits the number of discovery disputes over
which the judge must preside.
153. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 15, at 1355:
[P]arties to a lawsuit face a collective-action problem at the discovery stage. In one
version of the problem, it is a classic prisoner's dilemma: each party anticipates that
the other will use discovery abusively, so each responds in kind, and the result is an
equilibrium in which both sides are worse off than if they had exercised restraint.
154. See, e.g., Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, UnderstandingDiscovery in InternationalCommercial
Arbitration Through Behavioral Law and Economics: A Journey Inside the Minds of Parties and
Arbitrators, 16 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 165, 177-78 (2011) ("As in the typical Prisoners' Dilemma,
each party, fearing that the other party will not cooperate, ends up in a worse situation
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Parties are also better able to reach such agreements before
disputes arise. 5 5 Once a lawsuit is filed, parties have a much better
156
sense of their strategic positions vis-A-vis the discovery process. They
know, for example, which side is likely to have most of the discoverable
information and thus who will have to bear the brunt of discovery costs.
Parties that benefit in this calculus will be reluctant to give up their
advantage.
This fact reflects a central weakness with the current approach
to private ordering in litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
anticipate that parties will meet and confer about appropriate discovery
limits after the litigation is filed.15 7 By that point, however, the parties
can already predict the likely winner and loser under the default rules,
which will make it difficult to agree to ad hoc adjustments. Before the
dispute arises, however, the parties do not know on which side of the
lawsuit they will ultimately be and thus are closer to the Rawlsian veil
5 8 This positioning allows them to view the dispute more
of ignorance.s
dispassionately, increasing their willingness to commit to mutual
restraint.
Reducing the breadth of discovery through private ordering has
one final benefit-it allows parties to benefit from the limited discovery
normally found in arbitration while keeping their dispute in the judicial
system. Litigants choose arbitration because they think that, on the
whole, it will benefit them more than litigating in court, often because
they think the costs of discovery are too high in a traditional judicial
proceeding.1 59 Yet litigants also face downsides when they choose

(i.e. overspending) than the one that would be reached had the parties coordinated their actions
(i.e. not requesting broad discovery).").
155. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 15, at 1340 ("To be sure, agreement [about procedural
limitations] can be more difficult to reach after a dispute materializes.").
156. Id. at 1341.
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1)-(3).
158. The veil of ignorance developed in John Rawls's book A Theory of Justice is a thought
experiment in which people are asked to develop rules knowing nothing about their own future
positions, talents, or resources. This perspective, Rawls argues, would take personal
considerations and biases out of rulemaking. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971);
see also Bruce L. Hay, ProceduralJustice-Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1847 (1997)
("To the extent that impartiality is considered a central or fundamental value by the procedure
community, it may be that this community's own commitments require it to employ something like
the Rawlsian procedure when designing procedure.").
159. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving
Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000
Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2014) (surveying parties who chose to arbitrate
their disputes and finding that "[a] majority-roughly six in ten respondents-said they chose
arbitration because it afforded a more satisfactory process than litigation and limited the extent
of discovery").
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arbitration-they lose their right to an appeal, 16 0 for example, and they
lose the judiciary's expertise in applying its own jurisdiction's law.
Bespoke discovery allows parties to get the best of both worlds. They
can limit discovery without going to arbitration, thus reaping the other
benefits of the judicial system.
It is important to recognize that this type of private ordering is
only possible when the parties have a preexisting relationship.
Contracting parties can include bespoke discovery provisions in their
agreements, just as they might include forum selection or choice-of-law
provisions. Parties in tort cases, however, may not be in a position to
use bespoke discovery, especially if they do not have a prior
relationship. 1 6 1 Moreover, private ordering can be expensive, especially
when the negotiations and contracting relate to a dispute that may
never arise. In the short term, many parties may well decide that it is
not worth the expense of negotiating and drafting these provisions. As
with all new contractual innovations, however, these costs will likely
fall once courts provide guidance on the legality of specific terms and
these terms then become more standardized. 162
2. The Advantages of Cost Symmetries
Bespoke discovery also allows contracting parties to address cost
asymmetries in discovery. The American rule requires each side to pay
its own litigation costs regardless of who ultimately prevails in the
case.1 63 As scholars have long noted, 164 although this rule has its
benefits, it can also create incentives for some plaintiffs to file meritless
claims and other plaintiffs not to file meritorious claims. Bespoke
discovery can help address both situations.
First, cost asymmetries in litigation can incentivize plaintiffs to
file meritless claims. The default discovery rules assume that costs of
discovery are generally low and fall roughly evenly on both sides, and
in most cases, this assumption is correct. As discussed above, empirical
160. See Irene M. Ten Cate, InternationalArbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1109, 1110 (2012) ("The virtual absence of substantive review is one of
the most striking features of the arbitration process. Barring unusual circumstances, parties and
arbitrators have only one chance to 'get it right.' ").
161. This is not to say that bespoke discovery provisions will never work in tort litigation. In
certain types of tort cases, the parties do have a preexisting relationship and therefore an
opportunity to bargain over the terms of their future disputes.
162. Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 1, at 527 ("mhe cost of customization will predictably
decline over time as later users free-ride on existing private terms.").
163. Macon Dandridge Miller, Catalysts as Prevailing Parties Under the Equal Access to
JusticeAct, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2002).
164. E.g., Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH.
59, 91 (2013).
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data from the Federal Judicial Center demonstrate that the costs of
discovery in most cases are less than $20,000.165 Even in cases in which
discovery is voluminous, its burdens typically fall roughly evenly on
both sides.1 66 Most cases therefore do not present a significant cost
asymmetry, either because discovery costs are relatively small or
because these costs fall evenly on both parties.
In some types of cases, however, there is a significant cost
asymmetry. 167 These cases tend to share two key characteristics. First,
the defendants in these cases typically have possession of most
documents relevant to the case. These claims often turn almost entirely
on the defendant's conduct, making the defendant's record of key
importance in the case. 168 Second, in cost-asymmetric cases, it is often
difficult and therefore costly for the defendant to identify the relevant
documents. 169 In a case that turns on a single transaction or event,
defendants can pinpoint the key custodians and identify the relevant
documents fairly easily. In cases in which the allegations sweep more
broadly, however, the defendant will have to search through far more
records and interview far more employees to identify the relevant
information.
The necessity of such a broad review increases the defendant's
discovery costs as well as the corresponding incentives to enter into a
nuisance settlement. If a case survives a motion to dismiss, the next
opportunity for dismissal typically does not come until summary
judgment, which does not occur in most cases until after the parties
have completed discovery and incurred the associated costs. As a result,
if the case survives the 12(b)(6) hurdle, defendants are often willing to
settle for substantial amounts. These incentives mean that
economically rational plaintiffs will file claims that they know have
little merit and economically rational defendants will pay to settle
them.
On the flip side, cost asymmetries can also make it more difficult
for plaintiffs to pursue low-value claims. A plaintiff with a low-value
165. A study by the Federal Judicial Center found that the median discovery costs for plaintiffs
were $15,000, while the median discovery costs for defendants in these same cases were $20,000.
LEE & WILLGING, supra note 49, at 2.
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of
Proportionalityin Discovery, 50 GA. L. REV. 1093, 1103 (2016) ("Discovery allows one party to
externalize a large share of the responsibility and costs of his discovery request to his adversary.").
168. See Stancil, supra note 152, at 127 ("[C]laims in which the plaintiffs internal pretrial
costs are low tend to be claims for which there will be little inquiry into the plaintiffs activities or
damages.").
169. See id. at 130 ("mhe cases with the largest internal defense costs tend to be those (1) in
which the scope and depth of genuinely discoverable information under Rule 26(b)(2) is significant,
and (2) without an obvious factual transaction around which to limit discovery.").
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claim may not be willing to spend the money required to pursue it, even
if the claim would ultimately be meritorious. For example, if a claim
worth $10,000 has a seventy percent chance of success, but it will cost
the plaintiff $8,000 to prove the claim, a rational plaintiff will not file
suit. The cost asymmetry in these cases is not between the defendant's
costs and the plaintiffs costs but rather between the plaintiffs costs
and the amount at stake in the litigation.
Discovery essentially presents the opposite of the situation
outlined above. Rather than plaintiffs being able to externalize their
discovery costs on defendants, the problem in these cases is that
plaintiffs have to internalize some of the discovery costs themselves,
which can reduce the net value of their claims. Defendants can also
exacerbate these asymmetries by flooding plaintiffs with irrelevant
discovery material or otherwise forcing plaintiffs to engage in a broader
process than they would have otherwise chosen. The legal system has
tried numerous strategies to address the incentives associated with lowdollar-value claims, including liberal joinder rules and proportionality
requirements in discovery. 170 Yet these approaches could still leave
plaintiffs with meritorious claims that cost them too much to pursue.
Bespoke discovery rules could help parties address these
strategic incentives. Two of the discovery tools discussed in Section II.A
could be helpful in cases involving discovery asymmetries. First, parties
could include cost-shifting provisions in their contracts. Parties
frequently include fee-shifting provisions in their contracts, 171 but these
provisions only require losing parties to contribute to their opponents'
attorneys' fees. In contrast, cost-shifting rules would require each side
to share the costs of litigation, regardless of which side ultimately
prevails. Cost shifting is also a more targeted approach than fee shifting
because it only applies to discovery costs. Other litigation costsincluding the costs of filing and responding to motions and the costs of
preparing for trial-would remain with the party incurring the costs.
Cost shifting addresses the specific cost asymmetries that arise in the
discovery process.

170. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (providing broad proportionality requirements for relevant
information in discovery); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of FederalProcedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286,
315-16 (2013) (stating that amendments to the class action rules "clearly envisioned the use of the
class action to empower those without 'effective strength' to advance their claims, most notably
when each individual's damages were so small that economically they had no independent
litigation value").
171. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule
on Attorney Fees:An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 353
(2013) ("[Parties contract out of the American rule on fees in over 60% of contracts.").
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Second, parties could use ex ante contractual provisions to
shrink the overall scope of the discovery. For example, in cases in which
cost asymmetries are likely, parties could agree that they will negotiate
litigation budgets at the start of the case to constrain the total costs of
discovery. These budgets, which are now mandatory in certain classes
of cases in the United Kingdom, could ensure that discovery costs do
not drive litigation decisions. 172 Similarly, the parties could agree that
they will turn over the discovery process to a neutral third party, such
as a paid arbitrator. The parties would be able to obtain limited
discovery only after convincing the third party that their requests meet
an agreed-upon standard-for example, that the documents are
material to a claim or defense or, more stringently, that the documents
are essential to allowing the requesting party to prove their claim or
defense.
In short, bespoke discovery can benefit parties in the litigation
process both by reducing the total scope of discovery and by addressing
cost asymmetries that distort parties' incentives. As we will see,
however, bespoke discovery also presents its own challenges for
contracting parties.
3. The Challenges of Prediction
For all of the benefits of bespoke discovery, it also presents risks.
Concerns about the impact of bespoke discovery on unsophisticated
parties are addressed in the next Section, but even sophisticated parties
should be cognizant of the potential risks of predicting the optimal
limits on discovery in their prelitigation agreements. This Section
outlines several specific factors that may reduce the benefits of ex ante
contracting.
First, before the dispute arises, it can be difficult for the parties
to predict the appropriate levels of discovery. Contracting parties may
have some sense of the nature of their likely disputes, but the impact of
specific contractual limits may be harder to calculate. 1 7 3 Will a narrower
scope of discovery keep one side from obtaining the key documents they
need to prove their case? Will the dispute be one that requires three
depositions or ten? These questions are hard to answer before the
parties know the specific nature of their dispute and their relative

172. See, e.g., Tidmarsh, supra note 12, at 858-59 (proposing a model by which parties develop
a litigation budget at the start of the case and present it for the court for approval).
173. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 15, at 1334 ("Both sides assume that all the benefits and costs
can be catalogued, roughly measured, and weighed properly. But this assumption is flawed.
Benefits and costs are extremely difficult to evaluate in the intensely strategic environment of
litigation.").
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strategic positions. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure anticipate that
the parties will engage in significant private ordering once the case is
filed,1 74 but by that point, the parties have a much better sense of the
nature of the dispute and the type of discovery they will need to prove
their claims or defenses.
A second challenge of bespoke discovery is that it requires
parties to invest in drafting and negotiating a new set of contractual
provisions. It is fairly inexpensive for contracting parties to include
more traditional forms of bespoke procedure in their contracts because
these clauses have been around for years and there is boilerplate
language that parties can use. Bespoke discovery is new, however,
which means that parties would have to spend time negotiating specific
language. Additionally, there is little law around bespoke discovery.175
As a result, parties would have to invest the time to draft these
provisions even while recognizing that a court might ultimately find
them unenforceable or interpret them in an unexpected way.
Over time, these costs will fall as boilerplate language develops
and courts begin to interpret this language. Yet some amount of
contract-by-contract tailoring will always be necessary. It is easy to
amend a forum selection clause by simply inserting a new choice of
forum. It is harder, and thus more expensive, to craft tailored discovery
provisions that will be appropriate for the parties' specific relationship
and the specific disputes they are likely to have.
Finally, bespoke discovery requires parties to negotiate over
discovery that may never occur. Once the dispute is filed, parties have
an incentive to spend the time and money necessary to negotiate over
their discovery rights because these negotiations will impact the
litigation. Ex ante, however, parties know that they may never end up
in court and that any dispute resolution provisions they negotiate may
be irrelevant. Parties thus must invest time and money negotiating over
terms that they may never end up needing. In short, bespoke discovery
presents both financial and legal risks for contracting parties.
These challenges mean that bespoke discovery is most likely to
be used in a narrow set of circumstances. First, it is best suited for
situations in which the contracting parties have significant reason to
worry about discovery. For example, if the parties have previously been
in situations in which they felt that discovery was too broad or
negatively impacted their incentives in the litigation, they may be more
willing to invest the time ex ante to limit discovery in future disputes.
They also may take the initiative of suggesting such provisions to their
174. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 29.
175. See supra Section I.B.

2018]

BESPOKE DISCOVERY

1913

attorneys, even if these attorneys would have been reluctant to bring
up the idea on their own.17 6 Alternatively, bespoke discovery could be
helpful for contracting parties from different countries that are trying
to negotiate where to litigate their future disputes. A French company,
for example, might be far more comfortable litigating in U.S. courts if it
did not have to worry about broad U.S.-style discovery.
On the other hand, it is important not to become too pessimistic
about these concerns. Parties already opt out of the default discovery
rules in a variety of ways, including by opting in to arbitration. Most
arbitration bodies have default discovery rules, and these rules are
often quite specific and far narrower than the default rules in the
litigation system. For example, parties that agree in their contract to
arbitrate their dispute before JAMS, the largest private alternative
dispute resolution service in the world, agree that document requests
will be limited to "documents that are directly relevant to the matters
in dispute or to its outcome," 177 a far narrower standard than the default
rules in the federal courts. 178 They also agree that they will take no
more than one deposition unless the arbitrator permits additional
ones. 179 As a result, the idea that parties will never agree to tie their
own hands in discovery is belied by the fact that parties frequently
agree to do just that.
Nonetheless, focusing just on sophisticated contracting parties,
bespoke discovery has risks. These risks are not insurmountable, but it
will take determined parties with heightened incentives to contract
around default discovery rules. As we will see, the legal system has a
different cost-benefit calculus to consider when it comes to less
sophisticated parties.
B. Bespoke Discovery and UnsophisticatedParties
At the same time that it benefits sophisticated parties, bespoke
discovery could also exacerbate the inequalities in bargaining power
that already exist in civil litigation. It is one thing for sophisticated
parties to bargain over the scope of their discovery rights in future
litigation. It is another thing altogether for these same sophisticated
parties to include bespoke discovery in their boilerplate agreements
with unsuspecting customers or employees.
176. As discussed above, attorneys may have their own incentives not to suggest bespoke
discovery to their clients. See supra Section I.C.2.
177. JAMS, supra note 94, at 19.
178. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing parties to obtain discovery "regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case").
179. JAMS, supra note 94, at 21-22.
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In this regard, bespoke discovery raises many of the same
concerns raised about other types of bespoke procedure. Scholars have
long criticized boilerplate contracts in which individuals agree to
arbitrate their claims, waive their right to file a class action, or appeal
an adverse ruling. 180 The provisions create the very real possibility that
individuals may waive their rights without knowledge that they have
done so or without the market power to contest them.
The legal system offers some limited protection against these
concerns. As discussed above, bespoke discovery is subject to traditional
contract defenses, including the defense of unconscionability.1 8 1 A few
courts, especially in California, have held that more extreme forms of
bespoke discovery clauses are unconscionable, at least when used on a
plaintiffs. 18 2
vulnerable
against
basis
take-it-or-leave-it
Unconscionability doctrine, however, is unlikely to be a panacea when
it comes to procedural overreach in discovery. Overall, courts have been
quite reluctant to invalidate bespoke procedures, even in situations
involving significant inequalities of bargaining power. 18 3
The Supreme Court has also cautioned lower courts from
invalidating arbitration agreements specifically on this ground. In
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court stated, albeit in dicta,
that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") would prohibit states from
finding an arbitration agreement unconscionable on the ground that it
failed to provide for the full discovery rights to which parties are
entitled under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 184 The Court also
noted that the FAA would prohibit such outcomes even if the discovery

180. E.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704-05 (2012).
181. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
182. See Paulson, supranote 3, at 513-14 ("The availability of discovery has become a lynchpin
of state law unconscionability, and courts have not hesitated to find arbitration agreements
unconscionable that attempt to limit the amount of discovery available to plaintiffs."); see also
Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 70 F. App'x 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2003):
Lacking the ability to conduct adequate discovery, the employee will almost never be in
a position to move for summary judgment. She will, however, be quite vulnerable to
such motions on the part of [the employer]. And [the employer] will be in a far better
position to make such motions, as the witnesses to the allegedly wrongful action will
generally be in its employ.
183. See, e.g., David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State
Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1242-44 (2013) (citing post-Concepcion lower court decisions
upholding bespoke arbitration agreements).
184. 563 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2011) (holding that traditional contract defenses cannot be used to
invalidate as "unconscionable or unenforceable as against public policy consumer arbitration
agreements that fail to provide for judicially monitored discovery").
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limitations disproportionately disadvantaged vulnerable parties,18 5 one
of the key rationales used by courts to invalidate bespoke discovery
provisions as unconscionable. Accordingly, although the Supreme Court
has not directly addressed the legality of bespoke discovery, it has
strongly suggested that such provisions are not barred by
unconscionability doctrine, at least where the provisions are included
in arbitration agreements.1 8 6
Ultimately, the legal system relies on the market, not traditional
contract defenses, to police bespoke procedure. Yet this reliance is
deeply problematic. Consumers and other contracting parties often do
not know about boilerplate provisions in these contracts, and even if
they did, they typically do not have an opportunity to negotiate their
terms.1 87 Moreover, unlike stipulations entered into during litigation,
parties agreeing to ex ante limitations are often unrepresented by
counsel and thus may not appreciate the consequences of limiting their
discovery rights. And even if the market requires only a small handful
of erudite consumers or employees to watch out for contractual
overreaching, 188 there is no incentive for even this handful to police
drafters given that many contractual terms can be modified
unilaterally. 189 As Professor David Horton has argued, "The fact that
drafters enjoy the power to alter procedural terms unilaterally

185. Id. at 342 ("Or the court might simply say that such agreements are exculpatoryrestricting discovery would be of greater benefit to the company than the consumer, since the
former is more likely to be sued than to sue.").
186. Horton, supra note 183, at 1244 ('More generally, Concepcion has sown confusion about
the degree to which judges remain free to find arbitration clauses unconscionable.").
187. See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, Ousted: The New Dynamics of PrivatizedProcedureand Judicial
Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 127, 136 (2018):
One of the biggest criticisms of private procedural ordering is that the agreements to
limit procedure or opt out completely via arbitration are a result of unfair bargaining
power between the parties. Therefore, according to this argument, these agreements do
not reflect a state of affairs in which each party has meaningfully consented to
procedural alterations.;
James Gibson, Boilerplate'sFalse Dichotomy, 106 GEo. L.J. 249, 254-55 (2018) (arguing that "the
market fails boilerplate" because "[i]n many cases, its terms are first made available to consumers
late in the game after they have already made significant, unrecoverable investments in the
transaction" and "the cost to consumers of processing boilerplate-reading and assessing it-is too
high").
188. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warrantiesand Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1414 (1983) ("[Not
every consumer must shop for warranties to make warranty markets responsive to consumer
preference.").
189. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedureand UnilateralAmendments,
57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 608 (2010) ("Many consumer contracts expressly permit unilateral
modifications by the drafter.").
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undermines the bedrock economic assumption that adherents can
impose market discipline on procedural terms." 190
This point highlights the core challenge for all types of bespoke
procedure. Bespoke procedure benefits the sophisticated while
potentially harming their more unsophisticated brethren. Sophisticated
parties can bargain over their procedural rights and reach mutually
beneficial and efficient agreements. There can be real efficiency gains
when these parties spend time carefully negotiating procedures for
their future disputes. Yet this same ability to waive procedural rights
hurts more vulnerable parties. The existing legal framework offers
scant protection to those who are less legally savvy. As a result, bespoke
discovery is a step toward greater efficiency for some parties but a step
toward greater inequality and vulnerability for others.
It is cold comfort to say that these inequalities already exist in
the legal system. It is true that pro se litigants are already vulnerable
under existing rules and that sophisticated parties already have
considerable procedural advantages. Recognizing this fact, however, is
different than proposing new avenues of inequality, especially when
these avenues move the legal system further away from its core values
of equality and access to justice. Bespoke discovery may be just another
step away from these ideals, but every such step should prompt
policymakers to scrutinize anew just how much private ordering the law
should allow in the name of efficiency.191
Scholars have proposed legal reforms that could help address
these concerns. First, as outlined above, trial courts could require
litigants to disclose on the civil cover sheet if they have waived or agreed
to modify any provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or state
procedural codes. 192 These disclosures could then be a mandatory topic
of discussion at the pretrial conference. 193 This requirement would
bring all types of bespoke procedure before the courts, allowing judges
to review these waivers and modifications to determine if they
adequately protect vulnerable litigants. Second, courts could interpret
traditional contract defenses such as unconscionability more robustly
to protect litigants. If these protections applied equally in both
arbitration and litigation, they would have a greater chance of

190. Id. at 609.
191. See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1823 (2015)
(arguing that "making changes to the Civil Rules and doctrines in order to simply make litigation
cheaper-as a matter of a litigant's financial bottom line-is not acceptable" if the cost-benefit
calculus does not also take into account other negative effects on the parties and the judicial system
more broadly).
192. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 1, at 556-58.
193. Id. at 558.
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surviving a challenge under the FAA. Third, the Judicial Conference
could put more explicit protections into the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, specifying when parties can waive or modify specific rules.
These specifications could both guard against procedural abuses in
adhesion contracts and provide greater clarity to all contracting parties.
CONCLUSION

Discovery bears the brunt of the criticism directed at the
litigation system. Critics claim that discovery is too expensive and
sweeping and too often resembles a fishing expedition. Even if these
problems do not exist in all, or even most, cases, they are prevalent
enough to prompt repeated amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Yet the solutions do not rest exclusively with amendments
to the formal rules. Litigants already have the power to fix these
problems on their own through bespoke discovery provisions. In their
ex ante agreements, contracting parties can limit discovery, change the
default funding mechanisms, or even eliminate discovery altogether.
Sophisticated parties, in other words, can negotiate discovery rights the
same way they might negotiate other provisions in their contracts.
At the same time, bespoke discovery creates risks for less
sophisticated parties. The widespread use of adhesion contracts means
that many contracting parties already unknowingly waive their right
to file a class action or try their case before a jury. One can easily
imagine a similar boilerplate eliminating discovery making it
impossible for plaintiffs to prove their claims. Federal courts will likely
enforce this boilerplate, just as they have repeatedly enforced other
forms of bespoke procedure buried deep within commercial contracts.
Bespoke discovery has promise for some, but it also creates peril for
those who depend on the broad default discovery rules to vindicate their
claims.

